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INTRODUCTION

At the outset of the 105th Congress, Senators John McCain (RAZ), Russ Feingold (D-WI), and Fred Thompson (R-TN) introduced
Senate Bill 25, the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1997.
The impetus for campaign finance reform came from the 1996 fundraising scandals,2 which revealed blatant campaign finance violations,3 including fundraising calls from the White House by the Vice President,
White House coffees,5 foreign efforts to influence the United States
Elections, 6 and abuse of "soft money.",7 The 1996 campaign scandals are
considered to be the most serious campaign finance controversy since
Watergate.! However, despite revelations of the scandals, the Bipartisan
1. S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997); see also United States Senate, McCain, Feingold, Thompson
IntroduceBipartisan CampaignReform Act of 1997 (Jan. 21, 1997) (press release on file with the

Hofstra Law Review) (introducing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997). In this Note,
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, McCain-Feingold Bill, Senate Bill 25, and S.25 will be
used interchangeably to discuss the same piece of legislation.
2. History suggests that the best chance for serious campaign finance reform occurs when a
new Congress faces a major financial controversy or scandal that has occurred in the previous
election. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of FederalCampaign FinanceReform, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 25, 35 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997)

(writing that the 1996 elections demonstrated that the current campaign finance system is broken
and needs fixing).
3. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER AcnvTEs IN CONNECTION wrrH 1996 FEDERAL ELECION CAMPAIGNS 4459, 4499

(1998). Blatant abuses and violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") were
committed by the Clinton-Gore '96 Re-election Campaign Committee, the Democratic National
Committee, and various non-profit organizations. See generally id. The responsibility of the Senate Committee, however, was to investigate and report its findings of illegal and improper activities that arose during the 1996 federal elections and recommend possible reforms. See id. The
Committee holds no legislative authority. See id. "Now is the time to apply the knowledge gained
from this experience to effective legislation, or the American public must be prepared to endure
more blatant campaign finance law manipulation and corruption." Id. at 4499.
4. See id. at 42 (finding that Vice-President Gore made approximately 45 telephone solicitations from his White House Office, raising as much as $800,000 for the Democratic National
Committee).

5. See id. at 41 (detailing the hosting of 103 fundraising events in the White House for
small groups of large donors).
6. See id. at 46 (revealing that the Democratic National Committee's pursuit of contributions from wealthy and well-connected foreign nationals provided these foreign nationals with
almost unlimited access to the President and other important United States policymakers).
7. See id. at 4465 (explaining how the Clinton-Gore '96 campaign illegally used approximately $44 million in national committee soft money); see also Rebecca Carr, Thompson Widens
Scope as InvestigationBegins, 55 CONG. Q. 273, 273-74 (1997) (explaining how the Senate Gov-

ernmental Affairs Committee's investigation focused on the misuse of "soft money"). For a definition of soft money, see infra note 16 and accompanying text.
8. See Donald J.Simon, Beyond Post-WatergateReform: Puttingan End to the Soft Money
System, 24 J. LEGIS. 167, 167 (1998). The Watergate scandals led to the enactment of the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. See BuRT NEuBORNE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
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Campaign Finance Reform Act never passed in the 105th Congress. A
Republican led filibuster forced both sides to stop debating the bill in
the Senate on February 26, 1998.' Even though the House passed a

companion bill in early August 1998,'0 the Senate again proved unable
to break the filibuster and vote on the campaign finance reform bill."

The Senate was correct in not reaching a straight up and down vote
on the McCain-Feingold Bill. The Republicans, in opposition to the
McCain-Feingold Bill, filibustered primarily because they deemed the
bill to be an unconstitutional infringement on political speech,'2 and because it failed to address compulsory union dues. 3 This Note, however,

offers a different rationale for opposing the McCain-Feingold Bill. The
McCain-Feingold Bill failed to adequately confront one of the most serious problems that exists in federal elections today-the proliferation
of the wealthy self-financed candidate who can spend as much of his
own money in an attempt to win federal office. 4 Under the current sys-

& THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT BUCKLEY V. VALEO 2 (1997).
9. See infra Part l.B (discussing how the McCain-Feingold Bill passed a tabling motion by
a 51-48 vote, but once the Democrats realized they could not muster the 60 votes to shut off debate, debate on McCain-Feingold Bill concluded).
10. See 144 CONG. REC. H7330 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1998) (recording a 252-179 vote in favor
of the Shays-Meehan Bill, House Bill 2183, to reform the financing of elections for federal office);
see also Alison Mitchell, CampaignFinanceBill Is Approved by House, but FacesHeavy Opposition in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at A19 (explaining how House Bill 2183 was able to
defeat all
the competing measures and amendments in the House of Representatives).
11. See 144 CONG. REC. SI0,176-77, 10,183 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (recording a 52-48
cloture vote and the withdrawal by Senator McCain of the amendment that would have attempted
to end the filibuster); see also Eric Schmitt, Senate Effectively Kills Finance Overhaul, N.Y.
Tams, Sept. 11, 1998, at A16 (reporting that despite strong support in the House of Representatives, "supporters in the Senate failed to muster enough votes ... to end a Republican filibuster").
12. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,510-17 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Mitch
McConnell (R-KY)) (introducing four letters from the American Civil Liberties Union outlining
the constitutional infirmities with the McCain-Feingold Bill, in any form); 143 CONG. REC.
S10,008-26 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. McConnell). Senator McConnell fervently stated: "Write it down-we are not speaking too much in the American political process.
We are not going to pass this unconstitutional piece of legislation." Id. at 10,011; see also Amy
Keller, Will the CampaignFinanceReformers Finally Prevailin '98?, ROLL CALL, Jan. 26, 1998,
at A-36 (saying that Senator McConnell has earned the reputation as the "Darth Vader" of campaign finance reform for his ability to defeat campaign finance reform in the Senate).
13. See infra notes 82, 84 and accompanying text (explaining how the revised version of
Senate Bill 25, with respect to labor union dues, met with heavy criticism from Republicans, who
introduced their own legislation addressing union dues).
14. Current federal law does not place a ceiling on the amount of money a wealthy candidate
can spend out of pocket or the overall amount a federal candidate can spend on his campaign. See
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, COMING TO TERMs: A MONEY-IN-POLITICS GLOSSARY 23, 26

(1995) (defining the "millionaire loophole" as "[tihe absence of any limits ...on the amount
wealthy candidates can contribute to their own campaigns"; defining "plutocracy" as the wealthy
elite who, by virtue of their ability to use their money, dominate American politics by controlling
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tern, a candidate who lacks millions of dollars in personal wealth is left

to raise inordinate amounts of money, or is unable to run at all because
he cannot afford start up costs. 5 The McCain-Feingold Bill, however,
included added regulations, such as banning soft money 6 and redefining
issue advocacy, 17 which would have only enhanced the self-financed
candidate's advantage.
Part II of this Note focuses on the failure of the McCain-Feingold
Bill during the 105th Congress. Detailing the legislative history of the
bill, the analysis shows how party politics forced the co-sponsors to take
out the controversial "Spending Limits and Benefits" section of the

original bill. This section would have implemented an aggressive voluntary spending limit system, including free and reduced broadcast time
and reduced postage rates.'" This Note asserts that partisan politics
eventually caused the bill's demise. Part II discusses Buckley v. Valeo' 9
and the unfair advantage that the decision has afforded self-financed

public officials, or by winning major public office for themselves); JAMIN B. RASKIN & JOHN
BoNIFAZ, THE WEALTH PRIMARY: CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING AND THE CONSTI
ON 11-14 (1994)
(discussing the proliferation of the millionaire candidate who can buy his way into public office).
15. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCES: HISTORY,
FAcrS, AND CONTROVERSY 14-15 (Mary W. Cohn ed., 1992) (suggesting that a candidate needs at
least $25,000 of personal money to make a run as an open-seat or challenger in a House race, and
even more for a Senate campaign).
16. See infra Part H; see also S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 210-13 (1997); S. 25, 105th Cong.
§§ 101-02 (1997) (as amended); CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLrr/cs, supra note 14, at 14 (defining
"soft money" as political money raised by national and state parties that is not regulated by federal
campaign law because the money is given for party building purposes, such as bumper stickers and
get out the vote drives; however, this money is often used to benefit specific federal candidates),
In 1992, the two major parties raised approximately $83 million in soft money, and that figure
increased to $262.1 million in the 1996 elections. See Anthony Corrado, Party Soft Money, in
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 165, 167, 175 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
On the other hand, "hard money" refers to campaign contributions that are federally regulated. See
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLITICS, supra note 14, at 8.
17. See S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 404-06 (1997); S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 201-05 (1997) (as
amended); infra Part II.
[Issue advocacy is a] constitutionally-protected form of free speech to which contribution limits do not apply, involving the use of political advertisements and other mass
communications that promote a position regarding a political issue .... Groups and
individuals who pay for such communications have sometimes been charged with
"express advocacy"--that is, with advocacy that benefits particular candidates, a practice which is regulated by federal and state election law.
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 10.
18. SeeS. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 101-06 (1997).
19. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court invalidated sections 608(a), (c), and
(e) of FECA which placed limits on the amount of money an individual is able to spend on his
own campaign, the overall amount a candidate could spend on a campaign, and the amount of expenditures for express advocacy made independent of the candidate and his campaign, respectively. See id.
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candidates.Y In addition, this section evaluates the constitutional reasoning that the Buckley Court provided in invalidating expenditure limita21
tions.
Part IV focuses on the whether a self-financed candidate can actually buy a political office. Analyzing relevant data from the Federal
Election Commission ("FEC"),' findings of preeminent scholars in the
field,2 and two case studies (Michael Huffington's unsuccessful run for
the Senate in 1994,2 and Jay Rockefeller's successful campaign for the

20. The United States Supreme Court upheld the contribution limits of the FECA Amendments of 1974, but struck down expenditure limitations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58. Thus, with
the contribution ceilings intact from the FECA Amendments of 1974, which forced a candidate to
raise money in small increments, and with the Court striking down expenditure limitations, Buckley gave wealthy candidates an advantage. See NEUBORNE, supra note 8,at 12; RASKIN &
BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at xiii; Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protectionand the Wealth
Primary,11 YALEL. & POL'Y REv. 273, 328-29 (1993). The FECA amendments of 1974 were the
most comprehensive campaign finance legislation ever implemented, and while the law is an
amendment to the original FECA of 1971, the Act left little of the 1971 laws intact. See Corrado,
supranote 2, at 32.
21. The Buckley Court ruled that congressional efforts to regulate campaign spending must
advance a compelling governmental interest. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. The Court held that the
government has a compelling interest in avoiding actual (or the appearance of) corruption, and the
Court was concerned with the buying of legislative votes with campaign contributions. See id. at
26. Thus, the Court found that "the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on
outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to
which the Act's contribution limitations are directed." Id. at 53. But, the majority rejected the
compelling government interest in equalizing opportunities between the rich and poor. See id. at
48-49. Therefore, under Buckley, the only way to equalize the playing field is to subsidize those
with less money, since limitations on how much one can spend are unconstitutional. See
NEUBORNE, supra note 8,at 9.
22. Two preeminent scholars in the field of political science, Frank Sorauf and Herbert Alexander, have evaluated whether a self-financed candidate can actually buy political office. See
infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. Sorauf contends that wealthy candidates have the ability to buy elections in certain situations. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. Alexander
believes that Buckley gives self-financed candidates a clear advantage. See infra notes 192-95 and
accompanying text.
23. The data compiled from the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") is the financial activity of all Senate and House Campaigns from 1991-1996. See generally Federal Election Commission, CongressionalFundraisingand Spending Up Again in 1996 (Apr. 14, 1997) (press release on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (regarding the 1995-1996 financial activity of all
Senate and House campaigns) [hereinafter 1996 Fundraising];Federal Election Commission, 1994
CongressionalFundraisingSets New Record (Nov. 1995) (regarding the 1993-1994 financial activity of all Senate and House campaigns) [hereinafter 1994 Fundraising]; Federal Election
Commission, 1991-92 CongressionalSpending Soars to $680 Million-SpecialFactors at Play
Cause Spending to Jump 52% (Jan. 1994) (press release on file with the Hofstra Law Review)
(regarding the 1991-1992 financial activity of all Senate and House campaigns).
24. See generally HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND
PoLTmcAL REFtOPz (3rd ed. 1984); RASKIN & BONIWAZ, supra note 14; FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY
NAMERICAN ELECTIONS (1988).
25. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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Senate in 1984)," this section sheds light on why campaign finance reform must confront the issue of personal wealth advantage.2 7 The difference in resources between self-financed candidates and their opponents
makes it next to impossible for candidates without vast resources to win

congressional elections.'
Part V discusses the three major areas of the McCain-Feingold
Bill: spending limits, soft money, and issue advocacy. Part V analyzes
the effect each section has on the self-financed candidate problem. This
Note argues that if legislation, such as the McCain-Feingold Bill, is enacted, and soft money and issue advocacy are regulated, while no voluntary spending limits are implemented, self-financed candidates will gain
further advantage because a premium will be placed on personal
money. 29 Moreover, the fact that soft money and issue advocacy faced
similar constitutional and political roadblocks as spending limits suggests that spending limits should not have been stripped from the original bill.
Part VI discusses reforms that would effectively reduce the advantage of self-financed candidates and yet work within the framework of
the Buckley decision. The original version of the McCain-Feingold Bill
featured voluntary spending caps and benefits for complying candidates
and took serious steps towards reducing the advantage of self-financed

candidates. This Note, however, calls for voluntary total public financing of elections that would completely offset the advantage of the
wealthy candidate. Specifically, a minimum floor of funds would be
created for eligible candidates who choose to comply with the voluntary
26. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
27. See RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at xiii (suggesting that the candidate who spends
the most amount of money will almost always win the primary and usually go on to win the general election); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 15, at 14-15 (discussing the use
of a candidate's own money in election campaigns). Self-financed candidates generally loan
money to their campaigns with the intention that once they are elected, they can easily raise
enough money to repay themselves. See Center for Responsive Politics, Tracking the Cash: Candidate
Fundraising
in
the
98'
Elections
(visited
June
23,
1998)
<http:lwww.crp.orglpubsltrackingltrack.htm>.
In the context of discussion of self-financed candidates in this Note, direct contributions
and candidate loans make up the amount a self-financing candidate spends on his campaign.
28. Political parties favor self-financed candidates because this frees up funds for the parties
to support party candidates in other elections. See Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 27.
Moreover, it is hard for the parties to convince candidates without money to run for office. See
infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
29. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1081-82 (1996) (theorizing that campaign finance
reform which does not confront Buckley only increases the wealthy candidate's advantage).
30. See infra Part VI.A (discussing why Buckley will likely not be overruled).
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spending limits. Furthermore, if a candidate chose not to comply with
the relevant spending cap, the opposing candidate would receive
matching expenditures for the amount the non-complying candidate
spends over the expenditure limitation.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MCCAIN-FENGOLD BILL

A. The OriginalVersion
The first version of Senate Bill 25, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was introduced on January 21, 1997."' In a press conference to
introduce the bill, co-sponsor Senator Feingold remarked:
"For years, campaign finance reform has stalled because of the inability of the two parties to join together and craft a reform proposal that is
fair to both sides. We believe we have bridged those differences and
produced a bill that calls for mutual disarmament and will lead to fair
and competitive elections .... 32

Bill co-sponsor Senator McCain paralleled Senator Feingold's sentiments, stating that "[b]y passing a [bipartisan] bill that limits the effect
of money in politics and levels the playing field between the challenger
and incumbent, we can change the face of politics today. 33
The eighty-seven page bipartisan legislation was divided into five

31. See S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997). The original sponsors of Senate Bill 25 were Senators
Feingold, Thompson, and McCain. Senator Feingold is the Democrat Junior Senator from Wisconsin, McCain is the Republican Senior Senator from Arizona, and Thompson is the Senior Republican Senator from Tennessee and Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Special Investigations Committee. See id.
32. United States Senate, supra note 1. President Clinton pledged support for the McCainFeingold Bill. See Carr,supra note 7, at 274. On January 23, he gathered Senators McCain and
Feingold, as well as Representatives Shays and Meehan (who introduced H.R. 493, the House
equivalent of the McCain-Feingold Bill) in the Cabinet Room, and he told them that "he was
'behind them' and that he would personally wage a campaign to pass the law as a priority in his
second term." See id. H.R. 493 eventually turned into H.R. 2183, which passed in the House on
August 6, 1998. See supranote 10 and accompanying text; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
33. United States Senate, supra note 1; see also 143 CONG REc. S9999 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
1997) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator McCain stated:
[This] debate... will determine whether or not we will take an action that most Americans are convinced we are utterly incapable of doing-reforming the way we are
elected to office. Most Americans believe that Members of Congress have no greater
priority than our own reelection. ... Most Americans believe we will let this Nation
pay any price, bear any burden to ensure the success of our personal ambitions-no
matter how dear the cost might be to the national interest. ... [N]ow is the moment
when we can begin to persuade the people that they are wrong.
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sections: Senate Election Spending Limits and Benefits, Reduction of
Special Interest Influence, Enforcement, Miscellaneous, and Constitutionality. Under section I, candidates who voluntarily agree to limit their
overall spending,3' to spend less than $250,000 of their own personal

money, 5 and to raise at least sixty percent of their campaign funds from
individuals in their home states, 6 would be eligible for limited free
television time," additional discounted television time," and a discount

on postal rates for campaign mailings.39 Moreover, if a candidate agreed
to limit his spending, and was faced with an opponent who will not adhere to the spending limits of $250,000, the complying candidate's individual contribution limits would be raised from $1000 to $2000.40
Section II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act focused on reducing special interest influence. First, the bill tightened restrictions on

Political Action Committee's ("PACs") contributions to candidates." In
addition, this proposal also banned soft money so that national political
parties would no longer be able to solicit and receive these contributions, which are unlimited and unregulated by federal law.42
34. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 503 (1997). This section provided qualifications for a candidate
to be eligible for expenditure limitations. See id. In the primary, a Senate candidate's spending
could not exceed the lesser amount of 67 percent of the general election expenditure limitation or
$2.75 million. See idi§ 503(b)(1)-(2). In the general election, the limit could not exceed the lesser
of $5.5 million or the greater of $950,000 or $400,000 plus 30 cents multiplied by the voting age
population not in excess of 4 million, and 25 cents multiplied by the voting age population in excess of 4 million. See id § 503(d)(1).
35. See id § 503(a)(1) (1997) (stating that the aggregate amount of expenditures that may be
made during an election cycle by an eligible Senate candidate may not exceed 10 percent of the
general election expenditure limitation or $250,000).
36, See id § 502(e)(1)(A).
37. See id. § 102(l)(c). Each Senate candidate who qualified for the general election ballot
would be eligible to receive 30 minutes of free broadcast time from stations within his time. See
id
38. See id. § 103(1)(a). The reduced broadcast rate should not exceed 50 percent of the lowest charge of the relevant station. See id
39. See id § 104.
40. See id § 105.
41. See id § 201.
42. See id. § 211(a) ("A national committee of a political party... shall not solicit or receive
any contributions, donations, or transfers of funds, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act."). The FECA Amendments of
1979 created the soft money loophole. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1981) (codified in scattered sections at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55
(1994)). By allowing parties to spend money on candidates under the auspices of party-building
activities, a loophole developed that allowed parties to receive donations from corporations and
labor unions as "party building" activities. See generally Corrado, supra note 16, at 167-77. "[fln
1979 Congress authorized a circumscribed realm of unlimited party expenditures." Id. at 171. In
1978, the FEC helped to open the soft money loophole "by allowing corporations, labor unions,
and wealthy individuals to contribute funds directly to a political party free from the usual restric-
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Furthermore, Senate Bill 25 provided those candidates who complied with expenditure limitations and were eligible for benefits43 with
an increase in the amount of expenditures when their non-complying

opponent receives more than $10,000 in total independent expenditures. 44 Thus, when an independent expenditure totaling in the aggregate
of $10,000 had been made in the same election in support of an opposing candidate, or against the eligible candidate, the FEC was required to
provide the eligible Senate candidate notice within two business days
that their candidacy was allowed an increase in the applicable expenditure limit equal to
the amount by which the independent expenditure ex4
ceeded $10,000. 1
Section III, Enforcement, allowed for random audits and investigations of contributions received by an eligible Senate candidate to insure voluntary compliance with the Act," increased reporting requirements, 47 instituted more severe penalties for knowing and willful
violations, 4 and prohibited contributions of individuals not qualified to
vote.49 In the Miscellaneous section, the bill called for increased disclosure and accountability for those who engage in political advertising,"
distinguished between independent and coordinated expenditures 5 ' defined express advocacy,5'2 and banned incumbent use of "franked" mass
mailings.53 Finally, the bill included a severability clause' 4 and a review
of constitutional issues.5
tions on contributions, as long as the funds were to be used in connection with local party building, voter registration or other activity not directly connected to a federal election." Letter from
Burt Neubome, Professor of Law and Legal Director, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, to The Honorable John McCain and The Honorable Russell Feingold,
United States Senate 3 (Mar. 3, 1997) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
43. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 503(e) (1997). Section 503(e) determined whether a candidate
has met the requirements to be eligible. See id.
44. See id. § 406(c)(17)(A) (defining "independent expenditure" as "express advocacy; and
made without the participation or cooperation of, or without consultation with, or without coordination with a candidate or a candidate's authorized committee or agent!'). The Court in Buckley ruled that independent expenditures constitute free speech and cannot be limited by law. See
Buckley v. VaIeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (per curiam).
45. See S.25, 105th Cong. § 241(d)(6) (1997).
46. See id. § 302(a)(2)(A).
47. See id. § 304 (requiring reporting of contributions of $50, instead of the current requirement of $200).
48. See id. § 305.
49. See id. § 306 (disallowing foreign contributions).
50. See i&. § 402.
51. See id. § 405 (providing that once a political party makes a contribution, and engages in
coordinated activities with its candidate, it can no longer be called an independent expenditure).
52. See id. § 406(b).
53. See ihL § 403(a) ("A Member of Congress shall not mail any mass mailing as franked
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B. Politics:A Modified Version of Senate Bill 25
Regardless of the great public outcry for campaign finance reform,56 politics has and will continue to play a significant role in campaign finance reform. Since the passage of the Federal Election Cam-

paign Act ("FECA") Amendments of 1974, 5' no significant campaign
finance reform has received congressional approval. Moreover, cam-

paign finance support generally follows party lines, with Democrats
supporting reform and Republicans opposing any type of reform. 9 Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-ND) remarked in floor debate:
"For the last 21 years, since [Buckley], Democrats have tried to overcome obstacles put in place by that ruling. We have tried to find ways to
mail during a year in which there will be an election for the seat held by the Member ...
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 8 (defining the franking privilege as "[firee
postage for official, non-campaign-related correspondence conducted by federal office-holders").
54. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 501 (1997) (proposing that "[i]f any provision of this Act... is
held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act... shall not be affected by the holding").
55. See id. § 502 (providing that an appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of any provision of the Act).
56. See David Rogers, Campaign Reform Is Returning to Center Stage, but Not for Long,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at A20 (revealing that public opinion polls consistently show the public's unhappiness with the current campaign finance system); see also Francis X. Clines, Most
Doubt a Resolve to Change Campaign Financing,Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at Al
(reporting that close to "9 out of 10 people surveyed see a need for fundamental changes in fundraising procedures, or even a total overhaul"). But see Rogers, supra (finding that campaign finance reform is a low priority to Americans compared to other issues); All Things Considered
(National Public Radio, Feb. 12, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("[A] very low number of
Americans view [campaign finance reform] as their highest priority. It has to be their highest priority.").
57. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1994)).
58. Since the 100th and 101st Congresses, campaign finance has been the subject of significant congressional debate. See 144 CONG. REc. S867 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Daschle). No consensus, however, has been reached by members in any of these Congresses. See
id. In the 100th Congress, the Boren-Byrd Bill (Senate Bill 2), a bipartisan bill, would have created full public funding, but Democrats tried unsuccessfully to break a Republican filibuster seven
times. See Eighteen Years of Stalemate, 55 CONG. Q. 2450, 2450 (1997). During the first session
of the 102d Congress in 1992, a Democratic-led Congress passed campaign finance reform, but
President Bush vetoed the conference report with the backing of nearly every Republican in Congress. See Recent Action in the Congress,73 CoNG. DIG. 109, 109 (1994). The core of House Bill
3750 and Senate Bill 3 was a system of voluntary campaign spending limits, in conjunction with
public benefits such a voter communication vouchers for participating candidates, and a ban of
soft money. See Beth Donovan, CampaignFinance Bill, 50 CONG. Q. 1651, 1651 (1992). In the
103d Congress, the Senate and House passed campaign finance bills, House Bill 3 and Senate Bill
3, but the Republicans filibustered, and did not allow the bill to make it out of conference. See
Adam Clymer, CampaignFinance: The LateralPass,N.Y. TIMS, Aug. 9, 1998, § 4, at 6.
59. For example, a Democratic led 102d Congress passed campaign finance reform, but
President Bush vetoed the bill with heavy Republican support. See Recent Action in the Congress,
supra note 58, at 109.
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address the complexities, the problems, the shortcomings of that decision." 6 Senator McConnell, an ardent foe of any campaign finance legislation, commented after a bipartisan campaign finance bill was successfully filibustered6 62in the Senate of the 103d Congress: "'My party
did the slaying then."'
The original McCain-Feingold legislation was supported by all
forty-five Democrats in the Senate, but by only three of fifty-five Republicans.63 Facing heavy skepticism from the Republican majority,6

Senator McCain introduced a modified version of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act on September 29, 1997.5 In introducing his

revised bill, Senator McCain stated: "I hope that all of my colleagues
who raised such concerns will take a new and openminded look at this
bill. Gone are spending limits. Gone is free broadcast time. Gone are reduced rate TV time and postal subsidies." 66 Senator McCain, however,
made it clear that two fundamental principles are non-negotiable: seek-

60. 143 CONG. REc. S9998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle). See infra
Part IlB (discussing the Buckley decision).
61. See PAUL DICKSON & PAUL CLANCY, THE CONGRESS DIcnONARY: THE WAYS AND
MEANINGS OF CAPITOL HILL 118-20 (1993) (defining "filibuster" as a tactic employing a long
speech or constant talking to delay or stop action on a bill).
62. 143 CONG. REc. S9998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (quoting
Senator McConnell).
63. See Keller, supra note 12, at A-36.
64. Senators McCain and Feingold recognized that the original Senate Bill 25 had no chance
of getting a straight up and down vote, since only three Republicans supported the bill. See Monica Borkowski, Summing Up the Year in Congress,N.Y. TUvIES, Nov. 14, 1997, at A31.
65. See S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997) (as amended). At the outset of the second session of the
105th Congress, Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC) offered a joint resolution calling for a constitutional amendment that would provide Congress with the ability to impose mandatory spending
limits on campaign spending. See S.J. Res. 18, 105th Cong. (1997). By a vote of 38-61 on March
18, 1997, the bill was defeated. See 143 CONG. REc. S2397 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1997). Senator
Feingold was strongly against the amendment saying that the Members of Congress had three
choices. See 143 CONG. REC. S2240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997).
First, they can vote for constitutional amendments and partisan reform proposals that basically have predetermined fates of never becoming law.... Second, they can stand with the
junior Senator from Kentucky [Mitch McConnell] and others who stood here on the Senate
floor last June and told us all was well with our campaign finance system and we should all
be thrilled that so much money was pouring into the campaign coffers of candidates and
parties.... A third option, Mr. President, Senators can join with the Senator from Arizona
and myself and others who have tried to approach this problem from a bipartisan perspective and have tried to craft a reform proposal that is fair to all.
Id. (statement of Sen. Feingold).
66. 143 CONG. REC. S10,003 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator
McCain reached an agreement with Majority Leader Lott (R-MS), whereby a modified version of
Senate Bill 25 would be allowed to be introduced, but Lott would then be able to offer an amendment, namely the Paycheck Protection Act. See 143 CONG REC. S10,176-77 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1997).
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big a level playing field between challengers and incumbents and lessening the influence of money in elections.67
The amended Senate Bill 25 removed the controversial parts from
the original bill. First, section I of the original bill, entitled "Senate
Election Spending Limits and Benefits"'' was wiped out and replaced
with a small section near the end of the bill entitled "Personal Wealth
Option." 69 Specifically, the section barred the political parties from
making coordinated expenditures 70 on behalf of Senate candidates who

agreed to limit their personal spending to $50,000 per election. Thus,
under the modified bill, candidates who did not comply with the spending limits would no longer be entitled to coordinated expenditures from
their parties. Nevertheless, free and reduced broadcast time and postal
subsidies were eliminated from the new McCain-Feingold package.72
Notably, the amended bill also eliminated the controversial section
tightening restrictions on PACs. 73
74
Thethis
modified
BillI 25
on banning
soft money,
placing
ban inSenate
Section
of concentrated
the revised campaign
finance
reform

67. See 143 CONG. REC. S8290 (daily ed. July 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain).
68. See S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 101-06 (1997).
69. See S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 401-02 (1997) (as amended).
70. See CENTERFOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supranote 14, at 5 ("Coordinated ExpenditureIn federal elections, money spent by political parties on behalf of their presidential and congressional candidates in the general election. Such expenditures are limited by law, and are not direct
payments to candidates but payments by the parties to cover candidates' campaign costs.").
71. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 401(b)(1) (1997) (as amended). Current law permits the national committee of a political party to spend a limited amount of money in coordination with a
Senate campaign, the amount based on the voting population of the state. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)
(1994); United States Senate, McCain, FeingoldIntroduce Modifications to Campaign Finance
Reform Bill (Sept. 29, 1997) (press release on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter
Modifications].
72. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing the original Senate Bill 25).
The co-sponsors planned to offer an amendment that would have provided Senate candidates with
a 50 percent discount on television costs provided that they agreed to raise 60 percent of their
campaign funds from their home states, accepted no more than 25 percent of their funds in Political Action Committee ("PAC") contributions, and limited spending to $50,000. See supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text. Even in the amendment, however, free television time and postal
subsides would not have been included. See Modifications,supra note 71, at 2-3. However, Senator Lott never allowed modifications to be offered. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
73. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 201 (1997). The co-sponsors also planned to offer an amendment that would have tightened restrictions on PACs, by providing benefits for those candidates
who agreed to accept no more than 25 percent of their campaign funds in aggregate PAC contributions. See Modifications,supranote 71, at 3.
74. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,001 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain)
("[The] soft money ban would serve two purposes. First, it would reduce the amount of money in
campaigns. Second, it would cause candidates to spend more time campaigning for small dollar
donations from people back home.").
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package.75 The bill required all contributions to national parties to be
subjected to "hard money" restrictions. 6 To compensate for lost soft
money, a doubling of the limit that an individual could give to a state
party, in hard money, was raised from $5000 to $10,000,' and the aggregate contribution was raised from $25,000 to $30,000.78

Section II of the amended McCain-Feingold Bill redefined "issue
advocacy.79 Modifying the current definition of "express advocacy" to
provide a clear distinction between communications used to advocate
candidates and communication used to advocate issues, the bill defined
express advocacy as any broadcast television or radio communication
that mentioned the name of a federal candidate within sixty days of an
election."0
Section III, Disclosure, made no significant changes from the first
reform package."' Section IV, however, contained a key addition to the
bill, a codification of the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Communications Workers ofAmerica v. Beck. 2 Beck held that non-union employees in a closed shop union workplace who are required to contribute
funds to the union can request that this money not be used for political
purposes. 3 The revised bill codified Beck, allowing non-union members
to have their agency fees reduced by an amount equal to the portion of
fees used for political purposes, so long as a member files a timely objection.?
75. See S.25, 105th Cong. §§ 101-03 (1997) (as amended).
76. "Hard money" is defined as those contributions that are spent to affect the outcome of a
federal election and which are subject to the federal election campaign laws. See CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS,supra note 14, at 8.
77. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 102(a)(3)(D) (1997) (as amended) (increasing contribution
limits for individuals).
78. See i& § 102(b) (increasing the amount of aggregate contributions was also new to the
revised Senate Bill 25).
79. See id.§§ 201-05; see also supra notes 17, 42 and accompanying text (detailing issue
advocacy).
80. See id. § 201. Under section 201, groups or parties would be allowed to run ads supporting issues, but if a group or party wants to run an issue ad within 60 days of an election, they cannot mention the candidate's name. See id. If ads do mention a candidate's name, the expenditure is
subject to federal election contribution laws. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,004 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("[This section] does not do, as the majority leader has suggested, ban billboards[,] ...touch voter guides[,] ...[aind it doesn't ban one single television or
radio ad, ever.").
81. See S.25, 105th Cong. §§ 301-08 (1997) (as amended) (mandating greater disclosure
and enforcement of donors); S.25, 105th Cong. §§ 301-08 (1997); supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
82. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
83. See id.
at 762-63.
84. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 501 (1997) (as amended).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:181

After significant floor debate in the fall of 1997, a Republican led
filibuster blocked a straight up and down vote on the modified Senate
Bill 25.85 Moreover, Senator Lott (R-MS) proposed an amendment focusing on compulsory labor union dues that he knew would be opposed

by most Democrats.86 Senator Lott also used his power as Majority
Leader to prevent any attempts to amend his amendment to Senate Bill
25. Thus, by a fifty-three to forty-seven vote,88 the Democrats in the
Senate could not pass a "cloture" vote 9 to end the filibuster that was
blocking action on Senate Bill 25.? The Republicans, by a fifty-two to
forty-eight vote, fell eight votes shy of getting a straight up and down
vote on Lott's amendment. 9' Threatened with Democrats delaying tactics on other legislation,' 2 however, Senator Lott agreed to call up the
campaign finance bill before March 1998. Moreover, Lott agreed to allow the Senate to vote on a motion to table Senate Bill 25. 9'
85. See Office of Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold: CampaignFinanceReform Still Kicking
(Oct. 23, 1997) (press release on file with the Hofsta Law Review) (explaining how Senator Lott
employed a rarely used parliamentary tactic that prevented any Senator from offering modifications or changes to the bill).
86. The Lott Amendment to Senate Bill 25, the Paycheck Protection Act, would have
amended section 501 of the revised Senate Bill 25, calling for members and non-members of unions to consent to having their labor dues used for political purposes. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 501
(1997) (proposed amendment), reprinted in 143 CONG. REc. S10,176-77 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1997). But see 143 CONG. REC. S10,115 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("I
must oppose the amendment before the Senate. I do so not because I disagree with its intent. In
fact, I strongly support what it seeks to do. But, as with all difficult choices, a decision must be
made. In this case, I must decide that passage of overall campaign finance reform must be the
Senate's first goal."). Supporters of the Paycheck Protection Act had a contrary view. See id.
(statement of Sen. Warner (D-VA)) ("This is a 'freedom' pill for the ability of the American
worker to begin to think and exercise his or her own judgment. I commend those who support this
measure.").
87. See Carroll J. Doherty, Votes a Good Indicatorof Depth of Feelings on Both Sides, 55
CONG. Q. 2449, 2449 (1997).
88. The original vote was 53-47, but Minority Leader Senator Daschle forced more votes,
and Senator Hutchinson, who had originally supported the move to allow a vote, changed his
stance in two subsequent cloture votes, thus ending in a 52-48 vote. See id.
89. See DICKSON & CLANCY, supra note 61, at 58-59 (defining "cloture" as the "[p]rocess
by which debate can be limited in the Senate without unanimous consent" which is invoked by a
three-fifths roll call vote of all Senators present and voting).
90. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,466 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (noting a failed cloture vote).
91. See Doherty, supra note 87, at 2449.
92. See Carroll J. Doherty, Fight Over Overhaul Measure Spills Over to Other Bills, 55
CONG. Q. 2582, 2582 (1997) (discussing how Minority Leader Senator Daschle had led a Democratic filibuster of a massive six year transportation bill and threatened other bills).
93. See Borkowski, supra note 64, at A31; see also Office of Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold: Campaign FinanceReform Still Kicking (Oct. 23, 1997) (press release on file with the Hofsta Law Review) ("Feingold applauded the vote today in the U.S. Senate affirming that a majority
of Senators are unwilling to adjourn the Senate for the year or proceed with new business without
adequate consideration of campaign finance reform legislation.").
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Under this unanimous consent agreement, Majority Leader Lott
would introduce a campaign finance bill of his own, 4 and Senator
McCain would then be recognized to offer an amendment to Lott's underlying bill. That amendment would be the revised Senate Bill 25 that
was debated in the fall session.95 On February 24, 1998, the Senate voted

fifty-one to forty-eight against tabling the bill,96 but the sponsors acknowledged that they would not be able to muster the sixty votes necessary to shut off debate and end the Republican led filibuster. 97 Therefore, on February 26, 1998, campaign finance in the Senate seemed to
be a dead issue for the 105th Congress.9'
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1998, the House passed an equivalent
bill to the revised Senate Bill 25, H.R. 2183, which would effectively
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also S. 1663, 105th Cong. (1997)
(Paycheck Protection Act); 144 CoNG. REC. S869 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (introducing the Paycheck Protection Act); 143 CONG. REC. S10,379 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ('[W]e are talking about something [the Paycheck Protection Act] that is, in fact, an attempt
to destroy this McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill....").
95. Throughout the Fall and early Winter campaign finance debate, Senator Snowe (R-ME)
suggested trying to reach a middle ground bill that would have addressed both the compulsory
union dues issue as well as soft money and issue ads. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,724 (daily ed. Oct.
9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Snowe) ("I ... regret that the Senate has missed an opportunity today
to coalesce around a middle ground that would allow campaign finance reform to advance."). In
the Winter session, Senator Snowe introduced Senate Bill 1647, the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment,
which modified issue ads and the union dues issue, trying to gain Grand Old Party ("GOP") support. See id. (introducing Amendment 1647). But, on a procedural vote to table, or kill, the modified measure, all 48 Republican opponents voted to kill the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment. See Carroll J. Doherty, Senators' Votes Seem Set in Stone, 56 CONG. Q. 467,467 (1998).
96. See 144 CONG. REc. S867 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. Daschle) ("This
will be clearly an up-or-down vote on the McCain-Feingold bill, through a tabling motion, that we
have sought now for some time.... A vote against McCain-Feingold is a vote, in my view, to end
reform, at least for this Congress, once again."). The reason the vote was 51-48, and not 52-48,
was because Senator Harkin (D-IA), a McCain-Feingold supporter, missed the vote. See Doherty,
supra note 95, at 467.
97. See 144 CONG. REC. S1045 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998) (citing the failed cloture vote on
Senate Bill 1663, the proposed Paycheck Protection Act, a bill to protect individuals from having
their money involuntarily collected and used for politics by a corporation or a labor organization
and ending debate on Senate Bill 25). Sponsors acknowledged even before the debate that they
would not be able to get the 60 votes necessary to end the Republican filibuster. See Doherty, supra note 95, at 467.
98. See 144 CONG. REC. S1046 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Glenn (D-OH))
("Although we had a majority of the U.S. Senate, the majority did not prevail because of the cloture that we would have been required to get to break a filibuster."). President of Common Cause,
Ann McBride, whose group supported the McCain-Feingold Bill, responded to the end of campaign finance in the 105th Congress: "A minority of Senators today turned their backs on the
American people and used an obstructionist filibuster to thwart the will of the majority of Senators
who stand ready to pass campaign finance reform." Ann McBride, Statement of Common Cause
PresidentAnn McBride on Senate Filibusterof Campaign FinanceReform (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http:/lwww.comnmoncause.orglpublications/022698.htm>.
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ban soft money and curb issue advertisements.' After the House's approval of H.R. 2183, Senator Lott brought the revised Senate Bill 25
back to the Senate and allowed Senators McCain and Feingold to attach
Senate Bill 25 as an amendment to Senate Bill 2237, a Senate Interior

Appropriations Bill.

0

On September 10, 1998, the Senate voted fifty-

two to forty-eight against cutting off debate on Senate Bill 2237, eight
votes short of initiating cloture and breaking the filibuster.0 1 Soon afterward, Senator McCain withdrew his amendment, and the Senate's

consideration of campaign finance reform terminated for the 105th
Congress. °
Im.

THE CREATION OF THE MILLIONAIRE LOOPHOLE

A.

FederalElection CampaignAct

In 1971, reacting to the rising costs of federal campaigns, Congress
passed FECA.'t ° One of the reasons for implementing the 1971 legisla-

tion was that campaign costs skyrocketed from $155 million in 1956 to
$300 million in 1968. This increase was largely due to the rise of the

99. See H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. (1998). The legislative history of House Bill 2183 parallels
that of Senate Bill 25. House Bill 493 was introduced as a companion bill to Senate Bill 25 and
included voluntary spending limits, reduced postage rates, and broadcast time. See Telephone Interview with Alison Rak, Legislative Director, Office of Representative Christopher Shays (Oct.
19, 1998) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). After the revised Senate Bill 25 failed in the
Senate in November and February, Representatives Shays (R-CT) and Meehan (D-MA) introduced
House Bill 3256 (amended H.R. 493) on March 19, 1998. See id. Under the rules introduced by
the Republican leadership, House Bill 2183 was introduced first, and then all other competing
campaign finance bills were introduced and were technically considered amendments to House
Bill 2183. See id. Thus, 11 amendments faced a roll call vote, and the revised Shays-Meehan Bill
was the only proposal that commanded a majority. See id.; see also Alison Mitchell, Debate on
Campaign Finance Begins, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at All. When the Shays-Meehan Bill
passed in an official vote, the text of House Bill 2183 was struck and inserted with the text of
House Bill 3256 (the amended Shays-Meehan Bill). See Jeffrey L. Katz & Carroll J. Doherty,
Campaign Finance Gets Day in the Sun, But Senate's Shadow is Looming, 1998 CQ WEEKLY

2173, 2173-74; Interview with Alison Rak, supra;supranote 10 and accompanying text.
100. See Charles Pope, McCain-FeingoldBill on Campaign FinancingProves Dead on Revival, 1998 CQ WEEKLY 2402, 2402.

101. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also 144 CONG. REc. S10,182-83 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("Tomorrow's newspapers will probably not highlight the fact that we failed again on campaign finance reform. ... So I hope we can move forward. I will never give up on this fight as long as I am a Member of this body.... Mr. President, I
withdraw my amendment.").
103. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1973) (codified
as amended in 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994)).
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media based campaign.' ° Becoming effective in 1972, FECA repealed
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,0 5 placed contribution limits on the

amount a political candidate running for federal office could give to his
campaign,"' put ceilings on the amount a campaign could spend on
media,' O' and created stricter disclosure and enforcement procedures.' 3
However, FECA had major deficiencies; there were no real contribution
limitations on wealthy individuals and special interest groups, as the expenditure limitations only applied to broadcast media, and the disclosure and enforcement procedures were unclear, since there was no entity
that could act upon the data.' 9
Nonetheless, FECA was never tested in a federal election because
of the Watergate scandal," ' which led to the passage of the 1974 FECA
Amendments in the second session of the 93d Congress."' The amendments implemented contribution ceilings," 2 expenditure limitations, and
established a statutory scheme for public financing of presidential campaigns."3 The new amendments adopted section 608(a) of the 1971
104. See FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIEs 35 (1992).
Besides rising costs, another reason given for the 1971 law was that the Democratic party was
losing the money chase to the Republicans, and Democrats believed that FECA would act as a
neutralizer. See id.
105. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed in part 1948, 1972).
106. See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 9 (1972) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1), repealed in
1976) (placing a ceiling on contributions by any candidate or his immediate family to his own
candidacy at $50,000 for a presidential or vice-presidential campaign, $35,000 for a Senate campaign, and $25,000 for a House campaign).
107. See 2 U.S.C. § 104 (1994) (limiting the total amount that could be spent on media to 10
cents per eligible voter or $50,000, whichever amount is greater).
108. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1994) (closing numerous disclosure loopholes on federal candidates and political committees).
109. See Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election CampaignAct Amendments
of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REv. 357, 359 (1995) (discussing the various
problems with the 1971 FECA, including disclosure and enforcement procedures).
110. Investigations into the Nixon campaign showed a reliance on large contributions, illegal
corporate contributions, and undisclosed slush funds. See Corrado, supra note 2, at 32. Moreover,
allegations that contributors bought quid pro quo favors such as ambassadorships, gained special
legislative favors, and enjoyed privileges, led to this thorough 1974 reform. See id.
111. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-35 (1994)).
112. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b) (repealed 1976)) (placing limits on the amount that an individual or committee could give to a candidate-the most relevant
being that an individual could give $1000 in support of a federal candidate, and placing a $5000
limit on donations by PACs).
113. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-42 (1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. §§ 403-08) (creating an optional
program of public financing for presidential general elections and a voluntary system of matching
funding for presidential primary campaigns); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacleto PoliticalEquality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 609, 611 n.11
(1982) (noting that in 1974, the Senate passed a bill providing for the public financing of congres-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:181

FECA, but also enacted total spending limits."4 The limited Senate
candidate expenditures to $100,000 and $150,000 in Senate primaries
and general elections respectively, and $70,000 in both House primaries
and general elections." 5 In 1974, Congress also erected spending limits

on contributions by PACs and party committees, as well as creating an
administrative agency, the FEC, to oversee the gathering and publicizing of reports and enforcement of campaign finance legislation." 6
Frank Sorauf writes in Money in American Elections"' that the fear

of a wealthy candidate drawing on his own resources "was a major motivation in Congress behind the FECA limitations on a candidate's use
of his or her own resources.""..8 Further, the House Committee Report on
the FECA Amendments of 1974 declared: "Under the present law the
impression persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply
spending large sums in a campaign.""..9 Before the passage of the FECA
Amendments of 1974, a wealthy candidate's money could be offset by
an opponent receiving large donations from wealthy supporters or
PACs. '20 However, under the FECA Amendments of 1974, a system was
created which provided for contribution and expenditure limitations,
subsequently removing
the impact of both the wealthy donor and the
2
wealthy candidate. '

sional elections, but the House defeated the proposal); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Sitpra note 15, at 44 (finding that Congress dropped the fight for public financing of congressional
election in return for higher spending limits for congressional elections).
114. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994)).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976).
116. See SORAUF, supra note 104, at 8-9. The final FECA amendments did not contain the
Senate-passed provision for partial public financing of congressional campaigns. In conference,
Democrats in the Senate dropped the fight for public financing in return for higher spending limits
for congressional campaigns and a stronger independent election commission to enforce the law.
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 15, at 44.
117. SORAUF, supranote 24.
118. Id at67.
119. Wright, supra note 113, at 610 n.5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1239, at 3 (1974)).
120. See NEuBORNE, supra note 8, at 12.
121. See id Since the 1974 FECA Amendments, only two limited campaign finance reform
measures have been enacted: the FECA Amendments of 1976 and 1979. See Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979) (codified as
amended in 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1994)); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub, L.
No. 94-283 (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1994)). The 1976 Amendments allowed
corporations and labor organizations to establish segregated funds to be used for political purposes, and the 1979 Amendments removed certain local party activities from definitions of contributions and expenditures, thereby opening up the soft money loophole. See Burke, supranote 109,
at 364.
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B. Buckley v. Valeo
On January 2, 1975, in response to the FECA Amendments of

1974, a group of political conservatives, civil libertarians, members of
minor political parties, and liberal reformers challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.'2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upheld all of the law's major provisions, ' 23 but
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on appeal. On January 30, 1976, in
a 294 page opinion, 24 the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo,'2, issued a decision
which completely governs campaign finance jurisprudence today.
In its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the amount of money
that could be contributed to a campaign ' 26 but struck down the amount
of money that can be spent by a candidate.2' Specifically, the Court upheld section 608(b),'2 which set limits on how much individuals and
PACs could contribute to a candidate, but invalidated sections 608(a),
(c) and (e)(1). 29 The invalidated sections placed caps on the amount an
individual could contribute to his own campaigns, on the total amount
an individual could contribute, and on the amount an individual could
give on behalf of a candidate.'30
The Court held that these sections violated the First Amendment.'

122. Plaintiffs included Senator James Buckley (Cons. R-NY), Eugene McCarthy, the Socialist Labor and Socialist Workers Parties, the American Conservative Union, and the American Civil
Liberties Union. See NEUBORNE, supra note 8, at 4. The plaintiffs argued that contribution and
expenditure limitations hindered the freedom of contributors and candidates to express themselves
in federal politics, and thus it is more difficult for challengers to defeat incumbents. See id.
123. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 897-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
124. The opinion is divided into a 143 page per curiam opinion for the Court, statutory appendices and footnotes and 59 pages of separate opinions by five justices that dissent and concur
on specific issues. See NEUBORNE, supra note 8, at 6. The Court labored under severe time constraints from Congress who wanted a decision before the 1976 elections. See id. Thus, factual
hearings were not heard by both sides and the Court was forced to rule on all of FECA in a short
time. See id.
125. 424 U.S. 1(1976) (per curiam).
126. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994) ("No person shall make contributions ... to any
candidate ... with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$1,000."); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976); 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. V
1970) (repealed 1976); 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976) (placing limitations
on expenditures for express advocacy made independent of the candidate and his campaign).
Buckley upheld the sections of FECA that provided for the public financing of presidential elections, holding that Congress could attach spending limits to the acceptance of matching funds, and
also upheld mandatory disclosure law. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
128. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
129. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50-55.
131. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
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The Court also equated campaign spending money with speech'32 and:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.
This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. '
Constitutional scholar Burt Neuborne suggests that the Buckley
Court was wrong when it "'drew the general abstract principle that the
first dollar of spending is the same as the thirty-millionth. At some
point, money stops being speech, and
it becomes an oppressive force,
''134
reinforcing disproportionate power.
In the process of upholding this "money equals speech" proposition, the Court rejected the government's contention that FECA was not
regulating speech, but rather it was regulating the conduct leading up to
the speech; this analysis was accepted by the Supreme Court eight years
prior in United States v. O'Brien.13' The Buckley Court, however, asserted that the expenditure of money does not introduce a non-speech3
element or reduce the strict scrutiny required by the First Amendment.' 1
The Court required a compelling governmental interest for Congress to uphold FECA. 3 7 The government promulgated two compelling
interests: avoiding the reality or appearance of corruption, and fostering

132. See Burt Neubome, One Dollar, One Vote?, NATION, Dec. 2, 1996, at 21. But see J.
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J 1001, 1003-05
(1976) (arguing that money does not equal speech in the context of campaign finance).
133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted). "Being free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and
as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. n.18.
134. Democracy vs. FreeSpeech?, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1997, at 8, 8 (quoting Burt Neubome);
see also 143 CONG. REc. S2251 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Reed (D-RI), quoting
Ronald Dworkin, New York University School of Law professor) ("'The Buckley decision was a
mistake, unsupported by precedent and contrary to the best understanding of prior first amendment
jurisprudence. It misunderstood not only what free speech really is, but what it really means for
free people to govern themselves."').
135. 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (stating that a defendant can be prosecuted for burning his
draft card because there is a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element of the conduct; such regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and there is only an incidental restriction on the Faist Amendment, which is no greater than necessary to further that interest); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17 (citing O'Brien). The Court did
not find O'Brien to be persuasive. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
136. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17.
137. See id. at 10. To sustain rules that censor political speech, the Buckley Court required a
showing of a compelling governmental interest. See NEUBORNE, supranote 8, at 5.
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equal political participation."' The Court rejected the government's argument that a compelling governmental interest in fostering equal political participation existed,'39 but accepted the danger of corruption interest.' 40 According to the Court, "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
1 41
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."
Hence, the Court rejected the equal participation principle in favor of
First Amendment freedoms.'4" With respect to section 608(a), the Court
held that equalizing the financial resources of candidates is not a basis
to maintain this section because the candidate "may nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of more successful fundraising efforts."'43
Thus, the Court stated that the primary governmental interest
served by the Act was to avoid the appearance of or reality of corruption
of the political process.' 44 From the 1972 election, the Court reasoned
"that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders,"' 45 and that "[o]f almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact
of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions."'" The Court reasoned that no matter how much a candidate spends out of his pocket, no risk for quid pro quo corruption exists. 47 The Court found that "the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts
138. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29,47-49.
139. See id. at 48-49.
140. See id at 26-27.
141. l at48-49.
142. Numerous scholarly articles have been written on the equality principle which the
Buckley Court did not find to be a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Frank J. Sorauf,
Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94
CoLi. L. REv. 1348, 1349 (1994) (noting that the Court made a great error in not finding a governmental interest in protecting integrity of the electoral process); Cass R. Sunstein, Political
Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1400 (1994) (criticizing
Buckley for its hostility towards equality concerns). But see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:
A Perspective on the FirstAmendment and Campaign FinanceReform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045,
1045-46 (1985) (suggesting that Court was correct in its First Amendment interpretation of Buckley).
143. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54. It is worth noting that the Court's invalidation of section 608(a)
was made in four paragraphs of a 137 page per curium opinion. See id at 51-54.
144. See id. at 53.
145. Id at 26; see also CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLMCS, supra note 14, at 27 (defining
"quidpro quo" as "[w]hat vested-interest campaign contributors get from elected officials in return
for their financial backing").
146. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
147. See id. at 53.
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the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse."14
The Buckley Court drew a crucial distinction between contributions
and expenditures.149 According to the Court, the difference between the
two is that "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than do its limitation on financial contributions."'"5 The rationale is that
with expenditures, the candidate is doing the actual speaking, but with
contributions, there is only a political association.' Moreover, in upholding contribution limits, the Court found that it would limit the appearance or reality of corruption.' 2 However, in a separate opinion, Justice Burger disagreed with the Court's analysis: "By limiting campaign
contributions, the Act restricts the amount of money that will be spent
on political activity-and does so directly."''
Furthermore, in a separate opinion, Justice White called for the upholding of all of FECA." 4 Justice White reasoned that Congress had the
right to determine whether personal wealth ought to play a less important role in a campaign, and that FECA's limitations did not rise to the
level of speech protected by the First Amendment.' He stated: "It is
critical to obviate or dispel the impression that federal elections are
purely and simply a function of money .
Thus, White believed
"[t]he ceiling on candidate expenditures represents the considered
judgment of Congress that elections are to be decided among candidates
none of whom has overpowering advantage by reason of a huge campaign war chest."' 5 With respect to section 608(a), Justice White reasoned that upholding this section "tends to equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own
campaigns, to run for political office."'' s
Similar to Justice White, Justice Marshall found that equal access
to the political arena and restored confidence in the electoral process

148. Id.
149. See id at 58-59.
150. Id. at 23.
151. See Neuborne, supra note 132, at 22.
152. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
153. Id. at 241-42 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
154. See id at 263-65 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White was the only justice with political experience, having run John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign for the
mountain states. See SoRAUF,supra note 24, at 237-38.
155. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263-64 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
156. Id. at 265.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 266.
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were goals of FECA"9 Justice Marshall believed that section 608(a)
should be upheld because "the wealthy candidate's immediate access to
a substantial personal fortune may give him an initial advantage that his
less wealthy opponent can never overcome."'' 6 Moreover, understanding
the limitations of section 608(b) and that a candidate would have to
raise contributions from individuals in $1000 increments, Marshall recognized that the wealthy self-financed candidate would have an unfair
advantage.'61
Thus, Buckley is the great stumbling block to creating effective
limits on campaign expenditures. Importantly, however, the Buckley
Court did declare: "Congress ... may condition acceptance of public
funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the
contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding."'62 The Court used this rationale when
upholding the sections of FECA providing for the public financing of
presidential elections.'63 In floor debate supporting the voluntary
spending limits of the original Senate Bill 25, Senator Dodd remarked:
One of the McCain-Feingold's great advantages is that it is written
with the Supreme Court's Bucldey versus Valeo decision, in mind.
Trying to avoid the assertions that have been made by many, and I believe with good reason, they are concerned whether or not this bill
would actually pass constitutional muster.' 6

159. See iL at 286-90 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 288. "'In the Nation's seven largest States in 1970, 11 of the 15 major senatorial
candidates were millionaires. The four who were not millionaires lost their bid for election."' Id. at
288 n.1 (quoting 117 CONG. REc. H42,065 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Macdonald (D-MA))).
161. Seeid. at288.
162. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
163. See id. at 58-59; 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-42 (1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. §§ 403-08); infra
notes 263-64 and accompanying text (explaining the presidential public financing system).
"[The critics argue that virtually any inducement offered to a candidate to persuade her
to limit campaign spending is unconstitutional as a form of indirect 'coercion.' But the
Buckley Court clearly distinguished between inducements designed to elicit a voluntary
decision to limit spending and coercive mandates that impose involuntary spending
ceilings. If giving a Presidential candidate a $60 million subsidy is a constitutional inducement, surely providing free television time and reduced postal rates falls into the
same category of acceptable inducement."
143 CONG. REc. S10,105 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) (introducing a
letter written by Ronald Dworkin and Burt Neubome, supporting the McCain-Feingold Bill).
164. 143 CONG. REc. S2312 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd (D-CT)).
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IV. POST-BUCKLEY: CAN A SELF-FINANCED CANDIDATE BuY AN
ELECTION?
A.

Self-FinancedData

By upholding contribution limits and invalidating expenditure limits, the Buckley Court created a system that placed a greater premium on
the wealthy candidate than before FECA was passed, a system where a
candidate must raise money in small increments set by federal law, but
is allowed to spend as much personal money as he wishes.' 5 However,
before this Note can scrutinize the failure of the final version of
McCain-Feingold Bill to include spending limits or propose reforms
that will actually combat the millionaire loophole, this Note must fully
evaluate whether the Buckley decision allows a wealthy candidate to
buy political office.
In 1992, an average winning campaign for a seat in the House of
Representatives cost $543,000, and a winning campaign for the Senate
cost on average $3.9 million.' 6 Moreover, the data from 1992 reveals an
eighty-nine percent victory rate in the House and an eighty-six percent
victory rate in the Senate for candidates who outspent their opponents. 6'
In The Wealth Primary, Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz suggest that
candidates running for United States Congress compete in a wealth primary where the candidate who collects the most amount of money almost always wins the party's nomination and usually goes on to win the
general election if he is able to outspend his opponent.' 6s The authors
split the wealth primary into four classes: incumbents, millionaire challengers, campaigners, and the non-affluent. 69 While Raskin and Bonifaz
suggest that the incumbent is well situated to win the wealth primary, m
the authors believe that the millionaire challenger, the candidate who is
willing and able to spend whatever money is needed to win an election,

165. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). Self-financed
candidates often loan their campaign money and then get paid back through contributions once
they are elected. See RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at xiii. Before FECA, a wealthy candidate's influence could be offset by large donations. See NEUBORNE, supranote 8, at 12.
166. See RASKIN & BoNIFAZ, supranote 14, at 3.
167. See idUat 7.
168. See id. at xii.

169. See id.
170. Raskin and Bonifaz point to the large network of wealthy contributors and lobbyists,
plus the massive set of public subsidies, like free postage and a paid staff, as key factors facilitating the incumbent advantage in the wealth primary. See Ud
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has become very successful and adept at winning in the primary and in
the general election."'
The amount of personal expenditures spent by House and Senate
candidates reached a high of $122.6 million in the 1993-1994 election
cycle.' According to the FEC, contributions and loans from the candidate... doubled between the 1991-1992 and the 1989-1990 election cycle, and increased another thirty-seven percent in the 1993-1994 election cycle. 74 However, a study by the Center for the Responsive Politics
found that of the 149 candidates that ran for seats in the House and
Senate in 1995-1996 and who spent more than $100,000 of their own
money, only nineteen won.175 In 1993-1994, two-thirds of Senate candidates who spent over $100,000 of their own money lost at the polls. 1 76 In
1991-1992, eight of eleven Senate candidates who spent over $100,000
in personal spending lost.1 n And, in 1989-1990, all nine candidates
who
17 s
spent $100,000 or more of their own money lost at the polls.
Yet despite many self-financed candidates losing at the polls, some
are clearly winning.1 79 In the process, the number of millionaires in Congress has continued to rise; in 1992, seventy-one of 435 Representatives
(sixteen percent) and twenty-six of 100 Senators were millionaires
(twenty-six percent), and in 1994, the level rose to seventeen percent
and twenty-eight percent, respectively."W Similarly, research has revealed that wealthy candidates gain an advantage by being able to afford expensive, professional consultants who can help them plan their
strategy.' Further, the races that attract self-financed candidates are
171. See id.
172. See Glenn R. Simpson, A Surge in Rich House Hopefuls, ROLL CALL, Oct. 24, 1994, at
1, 15; 1996 Fundraising,supra note 23 (showing that candidate contributions and loans dropped
13 percent in the 1995-1996 election cycle from the 1993-1994 cycle, to $106.6 million from
$122.6 million).
173. See supra note 27 (explaining the common funding scenario for self-financed candidates).
174. See 1994 Fundraising,supra note 23, at 2.
175. See Todd S. Purdum, Money Politics Wasn't Defeated in California,N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1998, § 4, at 1.
176. See LARRY MAKISON, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING INTHE 1994
ELECTIONS 23 (1995).
177. See LARRY MAKINSON, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING INTHE 1992
ELECTIONS 29 (1993).
178. See LARRY MAKINSON, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE 1990
ELEcnONS 23 (1991).
179. For example, Senator Bennett (R-UT) spent $3,481,803 of his own money to win a Senate seat in 1991-1992. See MAKINSON, supra note 177, at 29. Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) spent
$7,273,000 of his own money in victory in 1993-1994. See MAKINSON, supra note 176, at 23.
180. See Craig Winneker, The Roll CallFifty, ROLL CALL, Jan. 24, 1994, at 1, 17.
181. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supranote 15, at 15.
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those for an open-seat, because these candidates can begin a campaign
with a huge television blitz. 2 In 1992, of the ninety-one open seats for
the House, the candidate who spent the most money won in seventy-one
of those races.'83 But in the general election, the advantage of personal
wealth lessens because issues become more important, and voters are
able to draw clear distinctions.' 4
Two experts on campaign finance, Frank Sorauf and Herbert Alexander, have extensively evaluated the likelihood of success of selffinanced candidates.'" Sorauf contends that the candidate who spends

millions of dollars on media campaigns for name and face recognition,
inevitably hinders his opponent's chances of winning the election.'86 To
the contrary, Sorauf also suggests that the failure of a candidate to raise
money is often a reflection of potential contributors' assessments of the
self-f'manced candidate's prospects for election, and that the selffinanced candidate does not have a broad range of support."" Moreover,
Sorauf suggests that incumbents are clearly able to cope with selffinanced candidates. 88 He contends that the self-financed candidate,
spending his own money, is one way to make elections more competitive.'89 Furthermore, the myth of the incumbent millionaire spending his

own money to remain office is not true, for incumbents rarely dip into
their funds, and in fact, they raise money like any other congressional
candidate.' 9
Alexander's evaluation finds that while self-financed candidates
often lose, this type of candidate has clear advantage.' 9' Alexander

182. See id.; see also RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at xii (saying that self-financed
candidates "make it clear that they will spend whatever needs to be spent to deter, discourage, or
overwhelm the opposition and thereby secure a majority of votes").
183. See RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at 8.
184. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 15, at 15.
185. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24; SORAUF, supra note 24.
186. See SORAUF, supra note 24, at 68; see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 15,
at 15 (stating that one clear advantage for the wealthy candidate is the ability to afford expensive
political consultants who can plan a self-financed candidate's campaign strategy).
187. See SORAUF, supra note 24, at 68.
188. In 1984, $13.8 of the $34 million spent in self-financed money was spent by candidates
who never even reached the general election. See id. at 66.
189. See id. Yet, self-financed candidates do not need to show constituent support, and some
find this problematic. See 143 CoNG. REc. S10,728-29 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Moseley-Braun) ("Allowing these self-financing candidates to avoid having to show a broad range
of support is, I believe truly undemocratic. In fact, I believe that every candidate should be able to
demonstrate that they have the support of a broad range of individuals and organizations, that their
candidacy has, in fact, come about as a true desire of the 'people."'),
190. See SORAUF, supra note 24, at 69.
191. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 27-28.
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points to name recognition as the major advantage of the rich candidate,
where his candidacy makes news as does any information on the family's personal fortune.' 92 Moreover, Alexander believes that Americans
admire a candidate who tries to buy an election.' He reasons that selfcontributing by a candidate may not be so bad, since the money that
self-financed candidates spend is not tainted or encumbered by any
special interests or wealthy contributors.'Y4
Political parties have had difficulty finding qualified candidates
who lack personal money to run for Congress simply because the cost of
running is too steep. Senator Daschle remarked:
I wish I could give you some indication of how difficult it is to tell a
candidate, 'I want you to run. I want you to seek one of the highest offices in the land. But to do that, you're going to have to somehow raise
$4.5 million between now and next November ... I don't know how

you'll raise the money. But never mind, you can do it." 96

Moreover, the political parties favor self-financed candidates because
the party can dedicate their time and money to other campaigns. 197 The
party does not have to worry about the wealthy candidate raising sufficient money to adequately compete, and the candidate is not beholden to
wealthy contributors.'

192. See id. at 28.
193. See id. Alexander points to American voters' infatuation with names like Roosevelt,
Taft, Kennedy, and Rockefeller. See id.; see also MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY 130 (1995)
("All the arguments that [Buckley] will produce a gilded Congress of rich people doesn't affect
people very much. They sort of like it when [Ross] Perot says, 'I'm buying the election for you."')
(quoting Rep. Foley (D-WA)).
194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White, J., concurring and dissenting)
(providing a rationale similar to Herbert Alexander's); ALEXANDER, supranote 24, at 23.
195. See Richard L. Berke, Run for Congress? PartiesFindRising Stars Are Just Saying No,
N.Y. TnaEs, Mar. 15, 1998, at Al (stating that many qualified candidates are not running for Congress because the money chase is too burdensome); see also 143 CONG. Rc. S9998 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle (D-SD)) ("Mhe system is broken. That experience is
repeated over and over and over again. How many more times will we have to tell someone who
may consider running for the U.S. Senate, 'You can't afford it. This is now a club for millionaires.').
196. 143 CONG. REc. S9998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997).
197. See note 28 and accompanying text.
198. See Berke, supra note 196, at Al; see also RAsKIN & BoNIFAz, supra note 14, at 14
("Millionaires in Congress often argue that we are better off having them as representatives because they will not be beholden to big-money special interests for campaign cash.").
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B. Case Studies: Huffington and Rockefeller

A brief case study of Michael Huffington's unsuccessful bid for
Senator in 1994 displays that the candidate who spends the most amount
of personal resources will not always win in a general election. 99 Adhering to Raskin and Bonifaz's wealth primary theory,2 Huffington outspent his opponent in the primary with his own money and won the Re-

publican party nomination."' Huffington spent $20 million of his own
money intelevision advertisements to garner name recognition, convey
his message, and convince California voters that he was a quality candidate.m Even though Huffington was a challenger to a popular, en-

trenched incumbent, Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), he only lost by
about 100,000 votes.' Intervening factors, such as Feinstein's record in
Congress, the fact that she was one of Washington's top fund-raisers
who spent $20 million of her own in the race and "Nannygate,"2° allowed Feinstein to prevail. Nevertheless, without his vast personal re199. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
201. Michael Huffington is the son of Houston oilman Roy Huffington, long time Republican
contributor, who was appointed by George Bush to be ambassador to Austria in 1988. See Sidney
Blumenthal, The Candidate,NEw YORKER, Oct. 10, 1994, at 54, 58. Huffington worked in the
family business for many years before deciding to run for Congress in 1992. See MICHAEL
BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN PoLrmcs 1994, at 141 (1995). Huffington
was elected to the House of Representatives for the 22nd District of California in 1992, with no
political experience. See id. He spent about five million dollars of his own money to garner this
House seat, the most money ever spent in a Congressional election. See Dan Balz, High Rolling in
California:Anti-Government ChallengerPours Millions Into Senate Race, WASH. POST, Oct. 6,
1994, at Al.
202. In January of 1994, Hufflngton had a six percent favorable rating and four percent negative rating and was thus unknown by 90 percent of the electorate. See Stuart Rothenberg, California Brawl: What We Learned From a Mega-Race, ROLL CALL, Nov. 17, 1994, at 18, 18. With
millions of dollars worth of broadcast ads spent by July, polls showed that the majority of residents in California had an opinion of Huffington. See id. Moreover, Huffington's ads destroyed
much of Feinstein's popularity. See id. By portraying incumbent Senator Diane Feinstein as a tax
and spend liberal and a career politician, Huffington was able to help lower Feinstein's favorability rating. See Balz, supra note 201, at Al. The amount of money Huffington paid for media advertisements helped him compete and stay in the race against Feinstein. See Rothenberg, supra.
Feinstein had been seen by many as an effective and terrific Senator. J. Bennet Johnston (D-LA)
had this to say about Feinstein: "'It
is the most remarkable one-woman-or man, one Senatorshow I've seen in my years in the Senate."' R.W.Apple, Jr., Strugglefor the Senate: In California,
a Daily Questfor Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 20, 1994, at Al.
203. If not for "Nannygate," a scandal that occurred close to the general election, many GOP
insiders believe Huffington would have beaten Feinstein. See Rothenberg, supra note 202, at 18
(discussing Nannygate, which refers to Huffington's alleged hiring of illegal aliens). Cable News
Network's Chief Political Analyst Bill Schneider suggests that "without Nannygate, Diane Feinstein would not have won." Interview with Bill Schneider, Chief Political Analyst, Cable News
Network, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 28, 1994).
204. See supranote 201-03 and accompanying text.
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sources, Huffington would not likely have either won the party's nomination, or come so close to victory in the general election.
In contrast, John (Jay) Rockefeller IV won the 1984 open-seat
Senate race in West Virginia by spending about $12 million of his own
money;0 s Rockefeller was worth a reported $200 million when he ran
for Senator."' Rockefeller outspent his opponent by approximately a
twelve to one margin,20 spending money on media ads that highlighted
his accomplishments in office, 2°s his commitment to the state of West
Virginia, his prestige in Washington, and his recent transformation into
a more down-to-earth politician.'
Prior to Rockerfeller's campaign, voters indicated that they would
not vote for him210 because many believed he only had a superficial concern for the needs of his adopted state of West Virginia.21' Nevertheless,
Rockefeller emerged victorious because of name recognition, experience, media ads which successfully made the people of West Virginia
believe in his candidacy, and his opponent's lack of experience.212
In sum, since incumbents are usually winners,213 it is clear that selffinanced candidates are losers more than they are winners. Nevertheless,
self-financed candidates do frequently win.1 14 The loophole created by
Buckley is unfair to the less wealthy candidate, who is left with the
choice of either raising money in small increments, or being unable to
run at all because he cannot afford the start up costs.2 5 Self-financed
candidates are able to drown out their less affluent opponents simply by

205. Rockefeller, an Exeter and Harvard graduate, is the great-grandson of the oil billionaire
who was America's richest man. See BARONE, supra note 201, at 1364.
206. See Craig Winneker, The Roll CallFifty, ROLL CALL, Jan. 24, 1994, at 17, 17.
207. See BARONE, supra note 201, at 1368.
208. After losing his first stint for governor of West Virginia in 1972, Rockefeller was elected
governor in 1976 and served eight years before deciding to run for the Senate in 1984. See
BARONE, supra note 202, at 1364.
209. See John B. Judis, Rocky Road: Why Money Can't Buy Jay Rockefeller Love, NEW
REPUBIc, Nov. 12, 1984, at 27, 31. Rockefeller was able to use the ads to make his money and
clout appear as a positive, showing that he was not trying to buy anyone's vote. See id.
210. See id at 30 (revealing a poll in 1992 concluding that 62 percent of West Virginians
believed Rockefeller had done either a fair or poor job as governor).
211. Seeid. at31.
212. Rockefeller won by only 40,000 votes, which suggests that without his money, he would
not likely have won. See id.
213. See SORAuF, supra note 24, at 66 (explaining that incumbents do not have to dip into
their family treasury and that their own funds account for none of their receipts).
214. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
215. See CONGPEsSIONAL. QUARTERLY, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that a candidate needs at
least $25,000 in personal money to make a run as an open-seat or challenger candidate in a House
race and even more for a Senate campaign).
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being rich, and in many cases, this money leads the self-financed candidates to victory.

V.

SENATE BILL 25

AND SELF-FINANCED CANDIDATES

Implementing the spending limits and benefits section of the original Senate Bill 25 would have reduced the amount of money in elections 2 6 as well as leveled the playing field between incumbents and
challengers.1 The section did not force candidates to comply, and yet
provided real benefits, such as free and reduced broadcast time and
postal subsidies, that would have likely provided sufficient incentive for
a wealthy candidate to adhere to the spending caps.21 1 With Buckley v.
Valeo governing campaign finance jurisprudence, '9 this section was a
very realistic measure that would have worked within the framework of
the decision.W
216. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,145 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. Cleland (DGA)) (discussing a study by the group Public Citizen, which estimates that if the expenditure limit
contained in the original version of the McCain-Feingold Bill were implemented, there would be a
spending reduction of $259 million).
217. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the goals of Senate Bill 25).
Moreover, while the McCain-Feingold Bill focused on incumbents and challengers, it is clear that
the drafters of the legislation, by creating voluntary expenditures limitations, were trying to stop
the proliferation of self-financed candidacies and the unfair advantage that these candidates enjoy.
See 143 CONG. REc. S10,001 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("[A]s a general rule, the candidate with the most money wins."). In a heated debate about Senate Bill 25,
Senators Feingold and McConnell argued the merits of money in elections and self-financed candidacies. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,118 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
("Senator [Feingold] has often said he thinks there is too much money in politics and we should be
able to entice [candidates] into limiting their spending. So I would just like to ask the Senator how
much is too much?"). In response to Senator McConnell's question, Senator Feingold said:
I don't have any theoretical limit that I believe in. If Michael Huffington wants to
spend $30 million in California, that's his right, but it is my belief that we ought to
provide some kind of incentive to those who would voluntarily limit their spending so
they could have a fair chance to get their message out. ... What I want is some kind of
fairness in the system, some kind of leveling the playing field so not just multimillionaires would get to participate.
Id. at S10,119.
218. See Letter from Ronald Dworkin, Professor of Law, New York University School of
Law, and Burt Neubome, Professor of Law and Legal Director, Brennan Center For Justice, New
York University School of Law, to Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold, United States
Senate 4 (Sept. 22, 1997) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Dworkin & Neuborne].
219. See supra Part IIlB (discussing the holding in Buckley).
220. See infra Part VI.B (calling for a public financing scheme with voluntary expenditure
limits and matching expenditures for the opposition of non-complying candidates). The President
vetoed the last public financing bill that was introduced in Congress, and Congress has not seriously considered a bill including public funding since then. See S. 3, 102d Cong. (1992); see also
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The modified Senate Bill 25 removed all serious spending limit
provisions and did not concretely attempt to limit the ability of the
wealthy to buy political office.2' Furthermore, the voluntary personal
wealth limit would not have persuaded self-fmanced candidates because
there was no incentive to comply. m Losing state party coordinated expenditures would not have deterred a self-financed candidate from
spending his personal resources.'m
A.

Soft Money

Banning soft money" 4 has the appearance of reducing the influence

of private wealth and corruption,'

but in actuality, a ban on soft money

would only alter the flow of money.2 6 In actuality, the millions of dol-

lars given to the political parties in soft money will not subside but
rather lobbyists, corporations, and labor unions will simply bypass the
parties and conduct their own campaign blitzes.2 7 Taking the 1992 election cycle as an example, the two political parties raised approximately
$83 million, which was subsequently spent on candidates for whom the
money was essentially intended.m In 1996, the Republican party collected $141.2 million, while the Democrats raised $122 million. 9
Regulating soft money will benefit self-financed candidates because the
less wealthy candidate, who has relied on the benefits of soft money donations in the past, no longer will have that option. Less wealthy candi-

143 CONG. REC. S10,106 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("If we are going
to pass a meaningful bipartisan campaign finance bill, we must drop the roadblocks to reform: taxpayers financing and spending limits.").
221. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also supraPart ll.B (discussing how,
in an attempt to win support for their bill, the sponsors removed controversial spending limits).
222. The revised version of Senate Bill 25 limited personal spending to $50,000 per election,
whereas the original bill held the personal wealth limit at $250,000. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101
(1997); S. 25, 105th Cong. § 401 (1997) (as amended).
223. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,728 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun)
("S. 25 does little to stop or control these upward spiraling costs, and that is disappointing, because self-financing candidates continue to be a rapidly growing phenomenon in our current political system.").
224. See supra notes 42,74-78 and accompanying text.
225. In Buckley, the Court held that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding the
appearance or reality of corruption. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
226. See Anthony Corrado & Daniel Ortiz, Recent Innovations, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 335, 341 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
227. See Jonathan Rauch, Vote Against McCain. Wait, Can I Say That?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
1997, at A22 ("[Pirivate money-a lot of it-is a fact of life in politics, and if you push it out of
one part of the system it tends to re-enter somewhere else, usually deeper in shadow.").
228. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
229. See Carr,supra note 7, at 274.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:181

dates will be left to find other avenues of large donor support, or be

forced to allow lobbyist groups to control their elections by running issue ad campaigns. 3 ° The wealthy candidate, however, will be able to

spend as much of his own money as he wishes, continuing to take full
advantage of the millionaire loophole. Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO)
discussing the millionaire loophole, remarked:
[A]ll we do when we limit everyone else is to say we want the wealthy
to have more and more advantage as they singularly and uniquely can
approach the podium and be heard in a society which ought to hear the
voice of every man and every woman based on merit rather than based
on their own personal wealth.2"

Moreover, soft money presents a constitutional roadblock.2 2 While
constitutional scholars, such as Burt Neuborne, argue that soft money
"involves no constitutional issues and can be closed tomorrow,"23 3 oth-

ers, such as Bradley A. Smith, suggest that political parties have the
same rights as other groups in the political arena. Smith, in prepared
testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, testified: "As Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commit-

tee makes clear, political parties have the same rights in the political
230.

See infra Part VI.C (discussing issue advocacy).
Though campaign finance restrictions aim to reduce the role of money in politics,
they have helped to renew the phenomenon of the 'millionaire candidate' .... The
ability to spend unlimited amounts, coupled with restrictions on raising outside money,
favors those candidates who can contribute large sums to their own campaigns from
personal assets.
Smith, supra note 29, at 1081.
231. 143 CONG. REc. S10,019 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
232. See id. at S10,344 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Senator McConnell)
(introducing some highlights of the American Civil Liberty Union's most recent statements about
the McCain-Feingold Bill) ("Accordingly, we submit that McCain-Feingold's sweeping controls
on the amount and source of soft money contributions to political parties and disclosure of soft
money disbursements by other organizations continue to raise severe constitutional problems.").
233. NEUBORNE, supra note 8, at 18; Dworkin & Neubone, supra note 218, at 4; United
States Senate, McCain and Feingold Release Letter Affirming the Constitutionality of Key Elements of the McCain-FeingoldBill (Sept. 22, 1997) (press release on file with the Hofstra Law
Review) (revealing that 126 legal scholars, including Burt Neubome and Ronald Dworkin of New
York University School of Law, found that there are no constitutional problems with the soft
money ban included in Senate Bill 25).
234. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 608 (1996) (holding that political parties may engage in independent expenditures); see also
143 CONG. REc. S10,517 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1997) (letter by Joel M. Gora, Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School, to Senator McConnell) ("[Colorado]squarely rejected the sweeping claims
that soft money spent by political parties was 'corrupting' the system and had to be stopped
). But.....
see 143 CONG. REc. S10,105 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (letter from Ronald Dworkin
and Burt Neubome to Senators McCain and Feingold) ("Colorado Republican did not address the
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arena as other groups. Thus, like other groups, they have the right to
raise unrestricted funds for the purposes of airing issue ads." '

Thus, a First Amendment issue exists with soft money, and on
whichever side of the fence one stands, this creates problems for the

passage of even a stripped down version of the McCain-Feingold legislation."6 A frustrated Senator McCain remarked in floor debate: "[T]he

current debate on the merits of campaign finance reform is being sidetracked by the argument that the Constitution stands in the way of a ban
on unlimited contributions to political parties.""
B. Issue Advocacy
Similar to the soft money ban, the section of the revised Senate Bill
25 clarifying the definitions of independent expenditures and closing the
issue advocacy loophole" confronted serious First Amendment opposition. 2" Buckley held that "[s]o long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want
to promote the candidate and his views."' Under current law, citizens
groups, such as the Sierra Club, Americans for Tax Reform, and the
AFL-CIO, can spend as much money as they want in issue advertisements, even last minute barrage attacks, so long as they do not urge the
election or defeat of a candidate.l In 1996, a significant amount of the
soft money raised by the political parties was used to fund issue ad

constitutionality of banning soft money contributions, but rather the expenditures by political parties of hard money, that is, money raised in accordance with FECA's limits.").
235. PreparedTestimony of Bradley A. Smith Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
the Constitution, FEDERAL NEWS SERvIcE, Sept. 18, 1997. Smith also contends that activities that
are less speech related, such as voter registration and slate cards, would have been restricted unfairly if soft money were banned. See id. Smith says that in the 1976 elections, when the 1974
FECA Amendments banned soft money, and a cash shortage existed for state and local parties,
there was a decline in rallies, bumpers stickers, and get out the vote drives. See id.
236. See supra Part ILB. Spending limits were removed from the original version for among
other reasons, the First Amendment, and soft money faced similar constitutional criticism from
Republicans. See supra Part V.
237. 143 CONG. REc. S10,104 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (letter by Ronald Dworkin and Burt
Neubome to Senator McCain and Feingold)
238. See S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 201-05 (1997).
239. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,344 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Senator McConnell)
(introducing a letter by the American Civil Liberties Union) ("The unprecedented restrictions on
issue advocacy contained in the McCain-Feingold bill are flatly unconstitutional under settled
First Amendment doctrine.").
240. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam).
241. See generally Corrado, supranote 16, at 227-42.
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campaigns. 4 According to Senator McConnell: "[T]here may be some
things that are in a gray area in this debate, but issue advocacy is not.
The court has been very, very clear, since Buckley, that it is impermis-

sible for the Congress to shut these people up when they seek to criticize us."" Further, the money spent on issue ads is in the form of inde4
pendent expenditures, which are not subject to federal election law.

As with the ban on soft money, the issue advocacy package included in both versions of Senate Bill 25 does not level the playing field

or reduce the amount of money in an election, unless spending limits are
included in the legislation. A candidate without significant personal
funds relies on advertisements from issue advocacy groups, whereas a
wealthy candidate might not need the support because he is able to
launch his own ads without the support of these groups.24
VI.

PROPOSED REFORMS

The type of federal campaign finance reform that Congress must
adopt is one where there is a level playing field between each candidate. 6 Since the Buckley Court invalidated sections 608(a) and (c), 7 a
loophole ridden system has allowed candidates to be exempt from expenditure limitations but not from contribution limits; subsequently, the
non-wealthy candidate does not have an equal opportunity in the political arena.2 As Part III of this Note detailed, while it is not fair to say
that a rich candidate can buy an election, 49 the rich candidate has a clear
advantage2 0
242.

See id.at 175.

243. 143 CONG. REc. S10,117 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see
also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 608
(1996) (holding that political parties have a right to run issue ads); Federal Election Comm'n v.
Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1062-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that spending on
television commercials does not violate federal election laws); Federal Election Comm'n v.
GOPAC, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1466, 1471 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that an organization is allowed to
spend corporate funds to advocate issues and criticize political opponents without being considered a political committee, so long as the organization's major purpose is not the nomination or
election of identified candidates).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50-55.
245. For the purposes of this Note, the Beck codification provision was important because
Republicans used the issue in an attempt to divide Democrats and halt the chances of Senate Bill
25 from passing. See supra Part II.B.
246. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that leveling the playing field was
a primary goal of Senate Bill 25).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a), (c) (Supp. V 1970) (repealed 1976).
248. See supraPart III.B.
249. The case study of Michael Huffington explains that each self-financed candidacy needs
to be analyzed individually. Too many factors exist to say that a self-financed candidate can sim-
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The only direct way to solve the campaign finance loopholes created by Buckley is for the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision."
But, even Burt Neuborne, who has vociferously condemned the Buckley
decision, and who has predicted the overturning of Buckley, 212 says:
"The Court may rally to the banner of stare decisis and refuse to overturn a precedent. '2 3 The fact is, the Court has not reconsidered Buckley
in the last twenty-five years, so it is not likely it will overrule the decision in the near future. " Thus, this Note calls for reform initiatives that
reduce the millionaire advantage while working within the framework
of Buckley.2
A. Public Financing
Without reversing Buckley and implementing mandatory spending
caps 2, 6 providing a congressional candidate with public resources is the
most logical way to offset a self-financed candidate's monetary advanply buy an election. Neverthless, Raskin and Bonifaz have shown that a candidate who wins the
wealth primary will almost always win the party's nomination and usually goes on to win in the
general election. See RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 14, at xii.
250. See supraPart IV.
251. See Neubome, supra note 132, at 24; see also SCHRAM, supra note 194, at 129-30
(quoting numerous members of Congress who are calling for the reconsideration of Buckley). But
see Mitch McConnell, Campaign FinanceReform: A Senator's Perspective, 8 J.L. & POL. 333,
333-34 (1992) (arguing that Buckley is good law and must be followed).
252. See Neubome, supra note 132, at 24. Neubome's optimism comes from the Supreme
Court's recent decision in ColoradoRepublican Federal Campaign Committee v. FederalElection
Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996), holding that spending by a political party in support of its
own candidates is protected by the First Amendment. Neuborne points to the dissent of Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens in Colorado, who held that contribution and expenditures can be limited.
See Neubome, supra note 132, at 22. Justice Thomas also found no viable distinction between
expenditures and contributions. See ColoradoRepublican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 636
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Moreover, Neubome believes that
Justices Breyer, Souter, and O'Connor are on the verge of deriding the distinction between contributions and expenditures. See Neubome, supra note 132, at 22. Hence, Neubome thinks a majority
of the Court may join Justices Ginsburg and Stevens in finding that contributions and expenditures
should be limited. See id.
253. Neubome, supra note 132, at 22.
254. In 1997, the Supreme Court denied hearing any campaign finance cases. Freshman
Senator Reed (D-RI) introduced a bill in the 105th Congress that would have forced the Supreme
Court to reconsider its 1976 Buckley decision. This legislation would have established mandatory
spending limits in future U.S. Senate elections. See S. 1057, 105th Cong. (1997). Senate Bill 1057,
however, never made it to floor debate.
255. The original McCain-Feingold Bill would have reduced the millionaire advantage, but
certainly would not have eliminated it. See infra Part VI.A & VI.B (showing various public financing systems that would eliminate the millionaire advantage).
256. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that Congress
could engage in public financing of elections and may condition acceptance of public funds on a
candidate agreeing to adhere to specific voluntary expenditure limitations).
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tage.27 Under this type of system, all citizens would have a legitimate

opportunity to be elected to public office28 Public financing involves
the giving of economic support to federal candidacies through a gov-

ernment subsidy, either in the form of direct cash grants,

9

matching

grants that supplement private contributions,' or free communication
vouchers.2'
The following three models of public finance are a good framework to understand the available types of public funding reforms. In the
presidential primary system, qualified presidential candidates262 who
agree to limit their spending are eligible to receive dollar for dollar
matching grants for the first $250 of each private contribution.2 63 The
criticisms of this approach are that it features only partial, and not full,
public financing, and the candidate who has the most amount of money
usually wins.6 In the presidential general election, major party presidential candidates are given direct cash grants at the beginning of the
general campaign.m However, the strings attached to accepting the di257. See Neuborne, supra note 132, at 24 ("Once we admit that running a democracy is very
costly, and that the high price of campaigns cannot be deflected to the rich without turning over
political control to them as well, public funding of elections becomes the obvious alternative.").
258. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The ConstitutionalImperative and PracticalSuperiority of DemocraticallyFinancedElections, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1160, 1190 (1994)
The purposes of [public funding is] to make it possible for all citizens to run for public
office if they so desire; to guarantee that all social groups are represented in the ranks
and agendas of political candidates and public officials ... and to preserve public officials' time for public work, and candidates' time for political discussion, by reducing
the amount of time used for raising money.
L
259. Direct cash grants are currently used for presidential general elections. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 9004(a)(1) (1994).
260. The presidential primary process uses a matching grant program. See 26 U.S.C. § 9037
(1994).
261. Both House Bill 3 and Senate Bill 3 included communication vouchers, and both passed
in the House and Senate in the 103d Congress, but failed to make it out of conference. See Burke,
supra note 109, at 390. House Bill 3 provided for voter communication vouchers on a matching
basis, while Senate Bill 3 provided communication discounts for postage and broadcast costs. See
id.
262. See BuRT NEUBORNE, A SURVEY OF EXISTING EFFORTS TO REFORM THE CAMPAIGN
FINANcE SYSTEM 12 (1997). To be eligible, a candidate must raise at least $5000 in contributions
in 20 different states of not more than $250 per contribution. See id. Moreover, the subsidy is lost
if the candidate does not receive 10 percent of the vote in two consecutive state primary elections.
See id.
263. See 26 U.S.C. § 9037 (1994). The funding for this program comes from a voluntary tax
check off box on federal tax forms that are deposited in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.
See Corrado, supranote 2, at 33.
264. In the past four presidential elections, the candidate with the most money raised as of
January 1 of the election year went on to win the primary. See NEUBoRNE, supra 262, at 13.
265. In 1996, the direct grant for the presidential general election was $62 million. See id. at
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rect grant is that the candidate cannot raise any money from private
contributions. 26 Publicly funded communication vouchers would provide candidates with free broadcast time, print advertising, or mailings.""
Moreover, both the campaign finance bill (which was passed in the
102d Congress and vetoed by President Bush) and the campaign finance
bills passed separately by the House and Senate in the 103d Congress

(which did not make it out of conference) included public financing
sections.m Senate Bill 3 would have provided candidates in the House

and Senate who adhered to voluntary spending limits with public funds
to match spending above the limit by a non-complying opponent.2 9

Once a non-complying candidate's opponent exceeded the voluntary
spending limit, the complying candidate would get a federal subsidy of
one-third of the general election limit.Y0 Similar to Senate Bill 3, House
Bill 3, the House's campaign finance package in the 103d Congress,
would have provided partial public funding in matching funds' 7 Senate

Bill 3 in the 103d Congress was not a direct public financing bill, as it
only provided candidates who agreed to abide by spending limits with

substantial television discounts. 272 The bill did provide back-up public

12.
266. See 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(1) (1994). Minor parties that polled between five percent and 25
percent in the previous election receive a direct grant in proportion to their previous election
showing. See NEUBORNE, supra 263, at 12. Parties that polled less than five percent in the previous election do not receive any money until after the election is over. See id.
267. Included in section I of the first version of the McCain-Feingold Bill were free and discounted broadcast time for candidates who accepted voluntary spending limits, as well as postal
subsidies. See S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 102-04 (1997).
268. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
269. See Donovan, supranote 58, at 1652.
270. See id. In the Senate, the voluntary spending limit would have ranged from $635,000 to
$8.9 million, depending on the size of the state. See id. Regardless, one-third of the total expenditure cap would have been given in matching funds for eligible candidates. See id. Senate Bill 3
would have provided House candidates who agreed to spending limits and successfully raised
money through private donations of $60,000 in payments of $250 or less with $200,000 of the
$600,000 spending limit. See id. Nevertheless, Republicans filibustered the move to take the bill to
conference. See Clymer, supra note 58, at 6.
271. Specifically, complying House candidates would be provided with public funding up to
one-third of the spending limit. See Campaign Finance Bills Compared, 52 CONG. Q. 262, 263
(1994). To be eligible for the public funding, the candidate would be required to raise 10 percent
of the spending limit in contributions of $200 or less from individuals. See id. at 262. The House
voluntary spending limit of $600,000 per campaign is not applicable if the candidate spends in
excess of 25 percent of the limit. See Burke, supra note 109, at 389.
272. See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign FinanceReform: A Key to Restoring the Health of OurDemocracy, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1132 (1994).
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financing for a candidate whose opponents exceeded the voluntary
spending cap.2 3
Both the public finance bills of the 102d and 103d Congresses

would have addressed the unfair advantage created by Buckley. They
attempted to rescue the federal campaign finance from many of its most
pressing shortcomings, namely allowing challengers to run competitive

races and reducing the scramble for private funds.274 The major problem
with these bills was that the matching subsidies totaled only a third of

the total expenditure limit. Thus, a non-wealthy candidate would nevertheless be disadvantaged in a campaign against a self-financed candidate who chose to disregard the voluntary limits. Moreover, wealthy
candidates would not be likely to accept public funding if they could
only receive partial public funding.

It remains imperative for Congress to enact a public finance system
that will insure that if a candidate chooses to disregard the voluntary

limits,2 5 sufficient incentives would be available so that the abiding
candidate can compete to a similar level of effectiveness as the noncomplying candidate. Therefore, total public financing is the only solution. Congress must create a total public financing system7 6 where the
qualified277 candidate would be able to receive a full subsidy before both
the primary and the general elections. The amount and form of the subsidy, as well as the expenditure limitation, should be decided by Con-

gress, 2' 8 as it was in the 102d and 103d Congresses. 29 Moreover, partici273. See id.
274. See SORAuF, supranote 24, at 371 (finding that spending limits with public funding will
end fund-raising pressures and prevent the influence of the wealthy individual who can spend
campaign dollar after campaign dollar).
275. The best reform would be an overruling of Buckley allowing for expenditure limitations
and then adopting total public financing. This would insure that candidates could spend a certain
total sum, whether from private or public money, and any candidate could have access to money.
But considering that Buckley is not likely to be overruled, this is not very realistic.
276. Jamin Raskin's and John Bonifaz's proposal entitled "Democratically Financed Elections" has been put forward by the Working Group on Electoral Democracy. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 258, at 1189 n.12. Raskin and Bonifaz presented this proposal as part of their article for the 1994 Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform at Columbia University. See id. The
proposal calls for total public financing with voluntary limits. See generally id. at 1189-1203.
277. The qualifications would be similar to the presidential primary system, namely that it
would be necessary to show a broad base of support by raising a certain amount of money in small
donations. See id. at 1188 (theorizing that a congressional candidate would need to raise a large
number of contributions in five dollar donations).
278. Campaign finance scholars believe that the Buckley Court may have struck down expenditure limitations because the limits were unreasonably low. See NEUBORNE, supra note 8, at
18-19. Thus, the spending caps for any public financing scheme needs to flexible, fair, and indexed annually to account for inflation. See id.
279. See supra notes 58, 270-71 and accompanying text.
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pating candidates should be able to receive heavy discounts on television time, print advertisements, and mailings."r If, however, a candidate
decides to opt out of the public financing plan, which is allowed under
Buckley, the advantage will be countered. The participating candidates
would receive matching additional funds equal to the excess of the noncomplying candidate's private expenditures."' If a challenger is facing a
self-financed candidate, it is important to insure that the opposing candidate will receive these matching additional funds in a timely fashion,
so that the millionaire candidate will no longer be able to outdistance
the opposition. For example, Michael Huffmgton likely would never
have won the Republican nomination if he did not have a clear advantage in the "wealth primary,"' 2 and Jay Rockefeller would likely never
have been able to convince the voters of his message if he did not outspend his opponent by a twelve to one margin.23 The goal of this type of
total public financing model is for the wealthy candidate to realize that
there is no advantage in spending private money. If this were to occur, a
system would be created where money is not the decisive factor in who
gets elected.
B. Senate Bill 1191
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) proposed a solution to combat the
candidate who disregards voluntary spending caps. On September 18,
1997, Senator Specter introduced Senate Bill 1191, a bill intended to reform the financing of elections.' While including a similar package to
the McCain-Feingold Bill with respect to soft money and issue advocacy,25 this bill would have provided public money equal to the amount
in excess for candidates whose opponents do not abide by the voluntary
spending caps." 6 Senate Bill 1191's public financing provision is mod280. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (explaining the subsidies that Senate Bill
25 would have provided to complying candidates); see also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 272,
at 1151 ("Television is the medium by which most voters get their information and by which federal candidates communicate with the public when they have the substantial resources necessary to
do so.").
281. See infra Part VI.B (discussing Senate Bill 1191, the standby public financing system);
see also Rasldn & Bonifaz, supra note 259, at 1198 (suggesting that in order to counter the privately financed candidate's excess expenditures, complying candidates should be able to receive
matching funds of up to 300 percent of the original amount of public financing).
282. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 205-212 and accompanying text.
284. See S. 1191, 105th Cong. (1997).
285. See S. 1191, 105th Cong. §§ 201, 231 (1997) (banning soft money and clarifying the
definitions relating to independent expenditures).
286. See S.1191, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997).
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eled on the 1996 Maine Clean Election Act,2 the nation's first public

funding bill for state elections, which included a standby public financ-

ing provision.2s 8 Thus, under Specter's bill, if candidate A spends $10

million of his money, there would be public financing for candidate B
up to the amount by which such expenditure exceeds the spending
cap.29 According to Senator Specter, "this standby provision ... would
act principally to deter somebody from spending $10 million of their
own money ...
It would stop people from buying seats in the U.S.

Congress."29
A combination of this "standby" public funding provision and voluntary full public financing would level the playing field and insure that
a wealthy candidate would have no advantage at any time during the
election process. Start up costs would be available through public financing, and a standby provision would insure that a self-financing
candidate did have not have an advantage if he did not adhere to the
relevant spending cap. At the very least, Congress should implement a
voluntary spending limit with subsidies for complying candidates, and a
standby provision that would provide a complying candidate with
matching expenditures for the amount that the non-complying candidate
spent over the limit.
The biggest problem in implementing public finance reform of any
kind, nonetheless total public financing, is the burden on government
financial resources. In fact, amidst a recession, Congress passed the

partial public financing bill in 1992, but George Bush vetoed the bill in
287. See Maine Clean Election Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-28 (West Supp.
1997) (passing with 56 percent of the Maine voters in 1996, public funding in Maine elections will
begin in the year 2000); see also 143 CONG. REc. S9637 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Specter) ("My bill incorporates the so-called Maine Standby Public Financing provision
288. See Maine Clean Election Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-28 (West Supp.
1997). The Maine Clean Election Act provides public funding for qualified candidates who raise a
specified number of five dollar contributions, who agree not to accept money from special interest
groups, and who abide by the relevant spending caps. See Corrado & Ortiz, supra note 227, at 369.
Once candidates receive public money, they cannot raise, nor spend, private money. This system is
applicable to primaries and general elections. See id. If, however, a candidate goes over the specified spending cap, the opponent will receive an expenditure that matches the amount by which the
candidate exceeded the spending cap. See id.;
Steve Campbell, Maine's Campaign Finance Law
Becoming National Model, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 18, 1997, at 8A. This Maine law,
which goes into effect in 2000, is considered to be the most sweeping campaign finance proposal
to ever become law. See Carroll J. Doherty, Overhaul Gridlock on the Hill Contrasts with Action
in States, 56 CONG. Q. 465 (1998).
289. See 143 CONG. REc. S9637 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter).
290. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter). Senator Specter's bill was not debated in the 105th Congress.
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large part because Congress could not explain how it planned to pay for
the reform."' This Note, however, has shown the importance of total
public financing, in providing all aspiring candidates an equal opportunity to run for political office. For that equal opportunity, Congress
could raise the dollar check off on federal income tax a few dollars.2'
Furthermore, a study done in 1993 by The Wall Street Journaland NBC
found that by a fifty-three percent to thirty-nine percent margin, American voters favor public funding of congressional campaigns through a
repeal of business tax deductions for lobbying expenses.293 If cost is the
only issue, Congress can surely find a way to finance the future of
America's democracy.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Congress must get serious about reform and institute a system of
public financing that features a standby provision for candidates who do
not comply with spending caps. 24 If this type of reform is implemented,
then legislation, such as the McCain-Feingold Bill, that proposes a ban
on soft money and issue advocacy will overhaul the campaign finance
2 9 Eliminating soft money and redefining issue advocacy
reform system.
confronted the illegalities and corruptive influence from the 1996 election, but simultaneously, would have made it more difficult for the less
affluent candidate to compete in the political process.
Considering the vetoed partial funding bill in the 102d Congress,
the defeat of a similar bill in the 103d Congress, and the failure of new
provisions to be introduced, partial public funding bills featuring partial
public funding or spending caps will likely incur substantial roadblocks
in the future. Moreover, the revised McCain-Feingold legislation, a bipartisan bill that removed the controversial voluntary spending limit and
benefits section from the original proposal, could not even reach a
straight up and down vote in the 105th Congress.2 6 Therefore, only
when the public outcry outweighs legislator exploitation of campaign
291. See S. 3, 102d Cong. (1992); H.R. 3, 102d Cong. (1992); see also Sorauf, supra note
142, at 1362-63 (pointing out that the problems of paying for partial public funding made it difficult to implement reform in the 102d and 103d Congresses).
292. The dollar check off program finances the presidential system. See 26 U.S.C. § 6096(a)
(1994). Currently, 17.7 percent of Americans check off the box.
293. See Wertheimer & Manes, supranote 272, at 1151.
294. See supra Part VI.A-B.
295. See supraPart V. Senate Bill 3, the partial public financing bill that never made it out of
committee, included a provision that would have eliminated soft money. See S. 3, 103d Cong.

§ 312(c) (1993).
296. See Part I.B.
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finance spending will a drastic overhaul of the system be implemented.
Congress must not skirt the issue of self-financed candidates by hiding
behind the First Amendment, something the revised McCain-Feingold
Bill clearly did.
Samuel M. Walker*
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